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ABSTRACT
            We show that agglomeration forces can reverse standard international-tax-competition
results. Closer integration may result first in a ‘race to the top’ and then a race to the bottom, a result
that is consistent with recent empirical work showing that the tax gap between rich and poor nations
follows a bell-shaped path (Devereux, Griffith and Klemm 2002). Moreover, split-the-difference tax
harmonization can make both nations worse off. This may help explain why tax harmonisation –
which is Pareto improving in the standard model – is so difficult in the real world. The key
theoretical insight is that agglomeration forces create quasi-rents that can be taxed without inducing
delocation. This suggests that the tax game is something subtler than a race to the bottom. Advanced
'core' nations may act like limit-pricing monopolists toward less advanced 'periphery' countries.
Since agglomeration rents are a bell-shaped function of the level of integration, the equilibrium tax
gap in our tax game is also bell shaped.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Does close economic integration, especially in the face of the growing mobility of 
capital both physical and human, require harmonisation of tax rates? Many observers 
believe that it does. It is often argued that the nations of the European Union, in 
particular, must agree on common tax rates if they are to avoid a “race to the bottom” that 
will undermine their relatively generous welfare states. The logic seems straightforward: 
other things being equal, producers will move to whichever country has the lowest tax 
rates, and absent any coordination of tax-setting the attempt to attract or hold on to 
employment will lead to a competition that drives tax rates ever lower. 
But things are not necessarily equal. Countries with generous welfare states tend 
to be countries that have long been wealthy; such nations offer capital the advantages of 
an established base of infrastructure, accumulated experience, etc. – in short, they offer 
favourable external economies. And within limits this presumably allows them to hold on 
to mobile factors of production even while levying higher tax rates than less advanced 
nations. On the other hand, should the tax rate get too high, the results could be 
catastrophic: not only will capital move abroad, but because that movement undermines 
agglomeration economies it may be irreversible. 
What this suggests is that in the face of the sort of agglomerative forces 
emphasized by the “new economic geography”, the tax game played in the absence of 
harmonisation may be something subtler than a simple race to the bottom. Advanced 
countries may be more like limit-pricing monopolists than Bertrand competitors; their 
interaction with less advanced countries need not lead to falling tax rates, and might well 
be consistent with the maintenance of large welfare states.  
The purpose of this paper is to think about international tax competition and 
harmonisation in the presence of significant agglomeration economies and goods market 
integration. The existing literature in this area is limited. Most of the vast tax-competition 
literature – see the survey by Wilson (1999) for instance – works with the ‘basic tax 
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competition model’ (BTCM). This is a one-period model featuring a single good 
produced by two factors; labour, which is immobile between regions and capital, which is 
mobile. Trade costs are zero, firms face perfect competition and constant returns, so there 
is no trade among regions and capital faces smoothly diminishing returns. Typically, 
governments chose the capital tax rate (the labour tax rate is either ignored or assumed to 
be identical to capital’s) in a Nash game. The standard approach is to compare 
equilibrium tax rates with no capital mobility and with perfect capital mobility; or to 
compare non-cooperative with cooperative tax setting both under prefect capital mobility. 
The customary result – equilibrium taxes are sub-optimally low – has been greatly 
extended and modified, but still remains the received wisdom on tax competition among 
social welfare maximizing governments. In one extension, where governments are 
assumed to deviate from social welfare maximisation, tax competition may improve 
welfare by moving equilibrium rates closer to the social optimum (in a typical second-
best fashion). Two aspects of this literature are noteworthy. First, an analysis of tighter 
goods market integration and tax competition is absent since the focus is on heightened 
capital mobility. Second, although a small branch of this literature (e.g. Janeba 1998) 
does consider imperfectly competitive firms, the standard tax-competition literature 
entirely ignores issues of agglomeration externalities.  
Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud (2003) review the tax and 
agglomeration literature that has emerge since the 1998 draft of our paper in detail, but 
three papers are particularly noteworthy. The first paper in this area is Ludema and 
Wooton (1998). This paper studies the impact of varying both factor-mobility costs and 
trade costs and seems to find that lowering either cost may – in contrast to the standard 
BTCM result – result in higher taxes being chosen in a tax competition game among 
governments. These authors, together with Andersson and Forslid (1999), and Kind, 
Midelfart-Knarvik and Schjelderup (1998) make the important point that agglomeration 
creates rents for the mobile factor that can be taxed. This point also plays an important 
role in the analysis below. Our paper focuses solely on the case where industry is fully 
agglomerated in one region and we find that the tax gap between nations is bell-shaped in 
trade openness – first rising and then falling as trade gets more open. Most importantly, 
we explicitly consider the implications of agglomeration forces for tax harmonisation 
schemes.  
The paper begins by briefly surveying the standard tax-competition literature’s 
main results.  Then we present some empirical trends in taxation within Europe. Next we 
turn to a simple, stylised model of economic geography in the face of taxes. We note that 
our main results turn on properties that hold in a wide range of economic geography 
models, so we conjecture that our results would hold in many models, but to be specific, 
we work with a model that is simple enough to allow us to obtain analytic results.
2 In this 
subsequent section, our specific model serves as a basis for examining the game that 
uncoordinated tax authorities might play. The final section presents concluding remarks. 
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2. STANDARD TAX COMPETITION RESULTS 
We briefly discuss the main tax competition results and their logic to boost 
intuition for why the inclusion of agglomeration forces leads to such different results. 
The Basic Tax Competition Model 
As Wilson (1999) writes: “A central message of the tax competition literature is 
that independent governments engage in wasteful competition for scare capital through 
reduction in tax rates and public expenditure levels.” The literature focuses on the ‘basic 
tax competition model’ typically ascribed to Zodrow and Mierzkowski (1986).  
Our rendition of the ‘standard tax competition model’ (BTCM for short) involves 
two nations, which we call north and south, and two factors of production, capital and 
labour. The two economies are perfectly competitive, they produce a single private good 
under constant returns and they trade this good costlessly. Trade equalises international 
prices but not factor prices since there are more factors than goods. For convenience the 
good’s price is normalised to unity everywhere. Labourers are completely immobile 
internationally. The world capital stock K
w is fixed and capital is either perfectly mobile 
across nations, or perfectly immobile. Home technology is given by: 
(1)   KK K L F F F L K F Y > > = 0 , ]; , [  
where L and K are the amounts of capital and labour employed, FL, FK and FKK are the 
first and second partial derivatives of the production function in the usual notation. The 
representative consumer is a labourer who owns all the economy’s factors and has 
convex preferences given by: 
(2)   ] , [ C G U U =  
where G is a public good (provided only by government) and C is private consumption.  
As far as the tax structure goes, we assume that the same tax rate is applied to all 
factor income generated inside the nations (source principle). We choose units of G such 
that the cost of G in terms of C is unity, so the supply of G just equals tax revenue.
3 The 
south has isomorphic tastes, technology and tax structure. 
It is critically important to distinguish between the amount of capital employed in 
the north and the amount of capital north owns, so we use ‘n’ to indicate the former and 
K to indicate the latter. Without loss of generality we normalise the world’s fixed capital 
stock, K
w, to unity, so n+n*=K
w=1, where n* is the amount of capital working in the 
south. The spatial allocation of capital is determined by the equalisation of post-tax rates 
of return, when capital is perfectly mobile. When capital is immobile, endowments define 
the allocation. Factors are paid their marginal products so the location condition is: 
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where t, L and K are home’s tax rate, labour force and capital endowment, while t*, L* 
and K* are the corresponding southern variables.  
The two governments maximise the utility of their representative consumer. For 
example, the north’s objective function is: 
(4)  K F n F F I F Y tY G I t C C G U K K t + − = = = − = , , , ) 1 ( ]; , [ max  
Here Y=F[n,L] is northern GDP, and I is northern GNP since factors are paid their 
marginal return and LFL=F-FKn given constant returns. The south has an isomorphic 



































where the left-hand side is the net marginal social benefit of more tax revenue; given 
standard concavity assumption on preferences, this falls as the tax rate rises. On the right-
hand side (RHS), η >0 is the capital-output elasticity and dn/dt is the responsiveness of 
capital to northern taxes, taking the southern tax rate as given.
4 Totally differentiating (3), 
we have: 
(6)  










where FKK and F
*
KK indicate the second partial of F with respect to K evaluated at, 
respectively, the north’s and the south’s equilibrium points; (6) is negative when capital 
is mobile and zero when it is not. The southern government’s first order condition is 
isomorphic.  
Major Results from the BTCM Literature 
The key results are illustrated with (5) and (6). With symmetric nations I=Y, so:  
BTCM Result 1: Capital mobility results in a capital tax rate that is too low 
from the social perspective.  
The key to wasteful tax competition is that dn/dt is negative (i.e. raising t lowers the tax 
base) when capital is mobile, so the RHS of (5) exceeds unity. This implies that taxes are 
too low, i.e. the marginal social benefit of taxation (i.e. WG) exceeds its the marginal 
social cost (i.e. WC). By contrast, immobile capital means dn/dt=0 so the first best is 
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increase in capital employment raises output (GDP) by FK, but since the extra capital must be paid FK, there 
is no change in domestic income (GNP). Some BTCM versions tax only capital, so the K/L choice is 
distorted. In such cases, tax-induced changes in capital employment do affect I.    5
attained. The positive and policy corollaries of this are: 
BTCM Result 2: There should be a negative correlation between capital 
mobility and the tax rate on capital. 
BTCM Result 3: An upward harmonisation of capital tax rates can produce a 
Pareto improvement. 
A second set of results corresponds to situations with asymmetric country size 
(size is measured by the supply of the fixed factor L). To be concrete, assume the north is 
larger, but that the two nations have identical relative factor endowments (L>L* but 
K/L=K*/L*). Given diminishing returns, it is clear that if taxes were equal in this setting, 
no capital would move because marginal products depend only of K/L. With this fact in 
mind, inspection of (6) shows that if taxes were equal, the north would have a lower dn/dt 
under our hypothesis since its n=K would be larger. But a glance at (5) reveals that in this 
case, the nations would have different tax rates, so our hypothesis of equal tax rates must 
be incorrect. Using the standard smoothness properties of a neoclassical economy, this 
line of thought demonstrates that the large country government will find it optimal to 
allow some of its capital to move abroad in exchange for setting its tax rate closer to the 
social optimal. Thus in equilibrium t>t
*, but also the capital-labour ratio is lower in the 
big country. To summarise: 
BTCM Result 4: Large countries should have higher tax rates than small 
countries, where size is defined in terms of supplies of the immobile factor.  
BTCM Result 5: The high tax country should have lower capital-labour 
ratios, i.e. there should be a negative correlation between tax rates and 
capital-labour ratios. 
BTCM Result 6: Large countries should export capital to small countries. 
All these results turned on the impact of taxes on the mobile factor’s spatial allocation, 
i.e. dn/dt. Since this is also the main topic of the new economic geography, and these 
models work with far richer underlying economies, it should be no surprise that a host of 
new insights emerges.   
We turn next to whether one can construct a prima facie case for the race-to-the-
bottom using the European data.  
2.1.  Taxation in Europe: Stylised facts 
Increased economic integration is not a new development. Within Europe, in 
particular, barriers to trade both natural and artificial have been falling more or less 
continuously since the late 1940s. So it is possible, by looking at previous European 
experience, to get some idea of how increased integration and tax competition among 
nations have interacted in the past.  
In making these comparisons we think of Europe as being divided into two parts: 
an advanced “core” that benefits from the agglomeration economies associated with 
being an established centre, and a “periphery” that does not. And – with full knowledge 
of the crudeness of the approximation - we associate these two ideal types with specific 
countries: Germany, Benelux, France, Italy with the core, Greece, Portugal, Spain,   6
Ireland with the periphery. We start by looking at average corporate tax rates since 
Devereux and Griffith (2002) show that the impact of tax on discrete investment 
decisions – which is typically the type of decision facing a multinational corporation 
looking for a production base – is not captured by the marginal rate. 
Figure 1: Core and periphery average corporate tax rates, 1965-2000 
Figure 1 shows how the average corporate tax rate – that is, total corporate tax 
revenue divided by GDP – has varied in the two regions since the mid-1960s. It is 
immediately apparent that there has not, at least so far, been anything that looks like a 
“race to the bottom”. Over a period during which the integration of the European 
economy was steadily increasing, the average corporate tax rate in the industrial core was 
fairly steady, fluctuating between 7% and 10%. If anything, the average has been 
climbing in recent years. The rate in the poor countries, on the other hand, fell from 1965 
to 1984, but has climbed dramatically ever since. The data in this graph are certainly an 
imperfect measure of true tax burdens, especially those affecting marginal investment 
decisions, but they also do not look at all like a race to the bottom has accompanied 
Europe’s integration.  
Even more surprisingly, it has by no means been uniformly the case that 
integration has led even to a narrowing of tax differentials. Tax rates have always been 
higher in the core than in the periphery; and the gap between them actually widened until 
the mid 1980s, narrowing only more recently. Most of the narrowing, however, has 
stemmed from an upward movement of the poor-4’s rates. Evidently the growing 
































































































































































Notes: Corporate tax revenue/GDP. Core 5 = Unweighted average of Germany, Benelux, 
France, and Italy. Poor-4 = Unweighted average of  Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Greece.  
Source: Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002) http://ifs.org.uk/corptax/internationaltaxdata.zip  7
integration of Europe in the decades following the Treaty of Rome did not make core 
nations feel more constrained by tax competition from low-wage nations. If anything, the 
graph suggests that there has been a race to the top. 
Figure 2: Effective marginal corporate tax rate, average over 16 nations, 1982-2001 
Total corporate tax collected as a share of GDP is a crude measure of a nation’s 
taxation of mobile capital. Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002) have recently calculated 
a more sophisticated measure that takes account of the corporate tax base as well as the 
rate for 16 OECD countries – the EU15 (less Luxembourg and Denmark) plus the Canada, 
Japan and the US. Unfortunately, the authors note that rules on tax systems are difficult to 
collect, so they are able to go back only to 1982 – just a few years before the turning point 
suggested by the cruder data in Figure 1. The measure they calculate is the effective marginal 
tax rate. As Figure 2 shows, the rate in the average nation was rising until the late 1980s 
at which point is declines.  
These trends certainly suggest that something more complex than the kind of tax 
competition that would produce a race to the bottom is going on. We turn next to a “new 
economic geography” model that may help make sense of the trends. 
3. TAX COMPETITION WITH TRADE AND FACTOR MOBILITY 
We present the model of the underlying economy before turning to the tax 

























































































Notes: This is the effective marginal corporate tax rate with assumed inflation; see Devereux, 
Griffith and Klemm (2002) for details.  
Source: Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002)   8
of agglomeration rents. Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud (2003) 
show that such rents arise in a wide range of economic geography models, including 
those of Krugman (1991) and Venables (1996). We thus conjecture that our results would 
hold in a broad range of models. To be concrete, and to be able to get analytic results, the 
model we adopt is a solvable variant of Krugman (1991) due to Forslid (1999).  
3.1.  Assumptions of the economic model 
The model assumes two nations, each having two sectors and factors. Countries 
have identical preferences and technology, but may have different tax rates. The two 
nations are called north and south, and the two factors are called ‘entrepreneurs’ and 
‘workers’. Entrepreneurs are the mobile factor, so we refer to them as K; workers are 
immobile and denoted as L.   
One sector, which we refer to as the agricultural sector, produces a homogeneous 
good using only workers according to constant returns technology and perfect 
competition. The cost function is waA, where w is the wage of workers and aA is the unit 
input coefficient. The other sector, called the M sector, is monopolistically competitive 
and faces increasing returns in its production of differentiated varieties. Specifically, 
production of a typical variety of the manufactured good involves the services of one 
entrepreneur – this is the fixed cost – and aM units of workers’ labour for each unit of 
output produced. Thus the total cost of producing x units of a typical manufactured 
variety is π +waMx, where π  is the reward to entrepreneurs.  
The representative consumer has preferences consisting of CES sub-utility over 
M-varieties nested in a Cobb-Douglas upper-tier function that also includes consumption 
of A, namely: 
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where CM and CA are, respectively, the CES composite of M-varieties and A. Also, n and 
n* are the mass (number) of north and south varieties, µ is the expenditure share on M-
varieties, and σ  is the constant elasticity of substitution between varieties; the regularity 
conditions we assume are 0<µ<1<σ .  
Trade in the homogeneous A-good is costless, but trade in manufactured varieties 
is subject to iceberg trade costs, so that a firm wishing to sell one unit of its good in the 
other nation must ship τ≥ 1 units since τ -1 units ‘melt’ in transit. The south has analogous 
preferences, technology and trade costs.  
3.2.  Intermediate results and equilibrium expressions 
This formulation yields a number of familiar results. Utility optimisation implies 
that a constant fraction of expenditure, µ, falls on industrial goods with the rest spent on 
CA. It also yields a unitary elastic demand function for A and standard CES demand 
functions for varieties of the industry good, i.e.:   9
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where pj is the price of a typical variety j, pA is the price of the homogenous good, and E 
is northern consumption expenditure. The south has analogous demand functions.  
On the supply side, free trade in A equalises the price of A across nations and thus 
(via perfect competition and constant returns) equalises the wage rates of workers in both 
nations provided only that both countries produce some A – a condition that hold as long 
as µ<½.
5 Thus trade in A equalises the wages of L, and taking southern L as numeraire, 
we have pA=w=w*=1. 
With monopolistic competition, optimising M-firms engage in 'mill pricing', so 
north-based firms charge a consumer price equal to aM/(1-1/σ ) in their local market and 
τ aM/(1-1/σ ) in their export market; southern firms set prices in an analogous fashion. Mill 
pricing also implies that operating profit is just 1/σ  times sales. Using (8) and noting that 
an entrepreneur’s reward is the operating profit of her variety, we have that the nominal 
reward to human capital (entrepreneurs) is: 
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w are the level of world expenditure and world endowment of 
entrepreneurs, respectively, sE is the north’s share E
w, sK is the north’s share of the world 
endowment of entrepreneurs (human capital), and φ≡τ
1-σ  measures trade openness; φ  is a 
mnemonic for the 'free-ness', or phi-ness, of trade, with trade getting freer as φ  rises from 
φ =0 with prohibitive trade barriers, to φ =1 with free trade. Here we have used the fact 
that because each differentiated variety requires one unit of K, the north’s share of world 
K is identical to the share of all varieties that are produced in the north. The expression 




*=φ sE/∆ +(1-sE)/∆ *. 
As an aside, observe that the B’s show how the stabilising force, the so-called 
local competition effect, works in this model. As more of the mobile factor moves to the 
northern market, the number of north-based varieties in competition for northern 
expenditure rises and the number of south-based varieties in competition for southern 
expenditure falls. Holding constant the relative market sizes (i.e. sE), this tends to lower π  
and raise π *. Thus a shift in firms from south to north generates forces that tend to correct 
the initial delocation. For example, starting at the symmetric outcome, total 
differentiation of B, taking sE as given, implies π  falls by –2(1-φ )
2/(1+φ )
2 and by 
symmetry, π * rises by 2(1-φ )
2/(1+φ )
2. Freer trade weakens this stabilising force with its 
strength falling at approximately the square of the rate of opening.  
                                                 
5 Showing this involves intermediate results derived below, but anticipating them, we note that world 
expenditure on CA is (1-µ)E
w and this must exceed the small nation’s ability to make A; taking the south as 
the small nation it has (1-sL)L
w to make A (sL is north’s share of world labour), so since E
w= L
w/(1-b), 
where b=µ/σ , the no specialisation condition is (1-µ)>(1-sL)(1-b). Since sL> ½ by supposition and b<1, 
µ>½ is a sufficient condition.    10
Entrepreneurs move to the region that affords them the highest level of utility, i.e. 
the highest post-tax real reward. As usual in models with agglomeration forces, this 
means there will be two types of outcomes: interior equilibria where the northern share of 
world capital – what we call sK – is such that 0<sK<1 and post-tax rewards are equalised, 
and core-periphery (CP) outcomes, where sK=1, or sK=0, and the post-tax reward is 
higher in the ‘core’ nation. This paper focuses on the CP outcomes, in particular on the 
core-in-the-north outcome. The location condition for this outcome is:  
(10) 
1























where P’s are the perfect price indices corresponding to (7) and Ω
c is the ‘agglomeration 
rent’.
6  
Inspection of the price indices shows how forward linkages work in this model. 
When entrepreneurs move from, say, south to north, they increase the share of all 
varieties made in the north. Since consumers bear the cost of trade, this factor movement 
makes life cheaper in the north and this, in turn, tends to make the north more attractive 
to the mobile factor. At the symmetric equilibrium, for instance a small south to north 
movement of industry lowers the P/P* ratio by a(1-φ
2)/φ
1-a, this destabilising effect gets 
stronger with increases in the share of expenditure on industry µ and the operating profit 
margin 1/σ , but it gets weaker as trade costs fall. 
World expenditure is the sum of worker income, L
w, plus all entrepreneurs’ 
income. Because total spending on manufactured goods is µE
w, mill pricing implies that 




7 Since the north’s 
expenditure equals L+π sKK
w, (9) implies that the north’s share of world expenditure, i.e. 
sE just equals (1-b)sL+bBsK, where sL is the north’s share of world labour.
8 For 
convenience, we choose units of labour such that L
w=(1-b), so E
w is unity, and we choose 
units of K such that K
w=1. Using the expression for B in (9), and gathering terms, we get 
the north’s relative market size, i.e. its share of world expenditure, in terms of its share of 
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For simplicity we work with nations that have equal labour endowments, so we take the 
north’s share of the world labour endowment, sL, as equal to ½ here and in all subsequent 
expressions.  
It is straightforward to show that the relative size of the northern market increases 
as its shares of workers and entrepreneurs rise. Expression (11) sheds light on how 
backward linkages function in this model. The movement of some of the mobile factor to 
                                                 
6 The location condition for an interior equilibrium is (1-t)Ω /(1-t*)=1 with Ω  evaluated at 0<sK<1, and for 
the core-in-the-south outcome it is (1-t)Ω /(1-t*)<1 with Ω  evaluated at sK=0. 
7 Using (9) and its southern equivalent, K
w[π sK+π *(1-sK)]=bK
w since BsK+B*(1-sK)=1. 






w, which simplifies to the expression in the text.   11
the northern market makes the northern market bigger and, due to the home-market 
effect, this in turn tends to make the northern market more attractive to entrepreneurs. 
The amount of ‘expenditure shifting’ (i.e. dsE) that comes with a small shift in production 
(i.e. dsK), is 4bφ /(1+φ )/[1-b(1-φ )/(1+φ )] at the symmetric point. This destabilising effect 
becomes stronger with increases in the share of expenditure on industry µ and the 
operating profit margin 1/σ . 
Because the strength of the stabilising local competition effect falls roughly with 
the square of trade freeness, while the strength of the backward and forward linkages rise 
roughly linearly with trade freeness, the symmetric outcome is stable when trade is 
sufficiently closed. Moreover, there is a level of freeness, called the break point, at which 
the symmetric outcome becomes unstable. If trade is freer than the break point, a 
symmetric dispersion of industry is not stable. Moreover, similar reasoning implies that 
there is a level of trade openness, called the sustain point, beyond which full 
agglomeration of all industry in one region is stable. With symmetric regions, these 
points are:  
(12)  



























φ φ  
where B and S indicate the break and sustain levels of φ . As usual, we cannot solve 
explicitly for the sustain point since 1-a is potentially a non-integer power. If full 
agglomeration is to be avoided with infinite trade costs – this is what Fujita, Krugman 
and Venables (1999) call the ‘no-black-hole condition’ – the breakpoint must be positive 
and this in turn requires a>1 since b>1 given our assumption that 0<µ<1<σ . We limit 
ourselves to parameter constellations that respect this condition. 
Since the φ
S<φ
B (see Forslid and Ottaviano, 2002 for an analytic proof), a gradual 
freeing up of trade flows will, in the presence of perfect capital mobility, eventually lead 
to full agglomeration of all industry in one nation. In this paper, we are concerned with 
tax competition when industry is already agglomerated in one nation, so we henceforth 
limit ourselves to φ >φ
B. 
3.2.1.  Bell-shaped agglomeration rent 
Agglomeration forces in our model imply that K’s real reward includes a location-
specific agglomeration rent. That is, entrepreneurs located in the north are not indifferent 
between locations; they strictly prefer the north and would thus be willing to bear a 
higher tax in order to be in the north. As it turns out, this is bell-shaped in trade openness. 
Intuition for this is simple. When trade is impossible, agglomeration is not really possible 
since firms cannot serve both markets from a single location. When trade is completely 
free, agglomeration is useless since location is irrelevant. Thus it is at intermediate values 
of openness – where agglomeration is both feasible and useful – that the importance of 
agglomeration is greatest.  
More precisely, the agglomeration rent is:   12
(13)  

















where this is found by using sK=1 in (9) and (10). Five aspects of this ratio are important 
for what follows. First, the ratio is unity when trade is perfectly free (φ =1), and it gets 
very negative as trade free-ness drops towards zero. The second point is that the 
agglomeration rent is bell-shaped, i.e. increasing in φ  when trade is relatively closed yet 
decreasing in φ  when trade is relatively open. To see this, we log differentiate (13): 
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Since the first right-hand term must be positive by the no-black-hole condition, the 
second term is increasing in φ  and is zero at φ =0, the derivative is clearly positive up to 
some critical value of φ  and after this it is negative. Solving (14), the top of the bell is at: 
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This expression is increasing in agglomeration forces as measured by ‘a’ and ‘b’. The 
fourth point, which also follows directly from the definition of agglomeration forces and 
in any case is easily shown, is that the maximum Ω
c increases in the agglomeration 
forces. The final point concerning the agglomeration rent is obvious, but greatly eases the 
analysis when we model tax competition explicitly; Ω
c does not depends upon taxes, only 
on trade costs and parameters. 
3.3.  No tax equilibria 
As a guide to intuition, we first solve the model when both tax rates are zero. In 
solving the model, the key variable is the division of the mobile factor K between north 
and south. There are two generic types of equilibria: interior equilibria where Ω =1 and 
0<sK<1, and corner solutions, where Ω >1 and sK=1, or Ω <1 and sK=0. In the economic 
geography literature, these corner solutions are called core-periphery outcomes. Not all 
types of equilibria exist for all levels of openness and not all are stable even when they do 
exist.    13
Figure 3: The ‘tomahawk’ diagram 
The various possibilities are summarised in Figure 3. This diagram plots sK 
against the free-ness of trade φ  and shows the equilibria with bold lines (solid lines for 
stable equilibria and dashed lines for unstable equilibria). For φ <φ
S, the symmetric 
outcome sK=½ is the only equilibrium and it is stable given the definition of the break 
point φ
B and the fact that φ
S<φ
B. For φ >φ
B, there are three equilibria: symmetry (sK=½), 
the core in the north  (sK=1), and the core in the south (sK=0). However, by definition of 
the break point φ
B, only the core-periphery equilibria are stable. Finally, for φ
S<φ <φ
B, 
there are five steady states. Two are core-periphery outcomes and are stable, two are 
interior asymmetric equilibria and are unstable, and the last one is the symmetric 
outcome, which is also stable. When distance has no meaning, i.e. φ =1, the location of 
production is not determined, so any sK is an equilibrium. It is important to note that 
welfare is higher in the region with the ‘core’ since its cost of living is lower (consumers 
in the core avoid trade costs that consumers in the periphery must pay). 
4. THE TAX GAME 
The tax competition literature assumes that governments value tax revenue for one of two 
reasons. If the government is benevolent, tax revenue is used to finance public goods and 
the government cares about revenue since consumers like such goods. If the government 
is modelled as a ‘Leviathan’, i.e. it does not maximise social welfare, the government’s 
objective is either to maximise the size of the state or to maximise its own utility, which 
may in turn depend on the probability of its re-election and its own wasteful 
consumption. In both the benevolent case and the Leviathan case, the government’s 
objective is increasing in revenue and decreasing in the tax rate per se, but since the tax 
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ambiguous sign. Indeed, the objective function has to be concave in the tax rate to get an 
interior solution when capital is immobile.  
To focus on fundamentals and to avoid lengthy asides on political economy 
issues, we work with a reduced-form government objective function. This function is 
meant to capture the essential trade-off that is at the heart of any tax competition model – 
governments’ desire to have high tax revenue but low tax rates. Specifically:  
(16)   K wL Y tY G W t G W W G π + ≡ = > = , , 0 ]; , [  
where G is tax revenue and ‘t’ is the tax rate; we assume that W is everywhere concave in 
t and increasing at t=0 so that the unconstrained problem for a government has an interior 
solution. Finally, to reflect the commonly observed fact that richer societies tend to prefer 
higher levels of taxation and government spending, we assume that taxation is a luxury 
good in the sense that the ‘t’ which maximises W is higher for the rich nation, i.e. the 
nation in which all industry is agglomerated. The southern government has an isomorphic 
objective function.  
We are interested in the case where industrial activity is already completely 
agglomerated in the north and in our simple model this means that the south literally has 
no industry to begin with, i.e. sK=1. Specifically, we work with a three-stage tax game 
where the north (the nation that initially has the core) sets its tax rate ‘t’ in the first stage, 
the south sets its rate ‘t*’ in the second stage, and migration and production occur in the 
third stage. Clearly this structure maximises the ability of the south to engage in fiscal 
competition. The last stage yields an economic outcome that is described by the 
equilibrium conditions laid out above, so we turn to the second stage.  
In solving the second stage, it is important to note that the southern objective 
function is discontinuous given the lumpiness of the underlying economy. If the south 
chooses a sufficiently high tax rate, no industry/entrepreneurs will move from north to 
south; southern tax revenue is then just t
*L
*. If, however, the south chooses a tax rate low 
enough to attract all industry, i.e. to capture the core, it has a higher tax base and thus 




The first task is thus to find the threshold southern tax rate below which all firms 
will want to delocate from the north to the south. This ‘break-point tax rate’ – what we 
call t*
b – is defined as the southern tax rate that would make a north-based firm just 
indifferent to moving south when all other firms were in the north. Thus, t*
b solves what 
we call the “no delocation condition”: 
(17)   (1 * ) (1 )
bc tt −= Ω −  
Plainly, t*
b depends upon t and Ω
c directly, with t*
b rising with t and falling with Ω
c.  
Figure 4 illustrates the discontinuous problem facing southern tax setters in the 
second stage. The vertical axis shows the metric for the government’s objective function 
(euros) and the horizontal axis plots the southern tax rate t*. The top bell-shaped curve is 
the southern objective function when the core has delocated to the south. The lower bell-
shaped curve is the southern objective function when the core remains in the north. 
Taking t as set in stage one, we find the optimal southern tax rate by comparing the   15
optimal t
* from the two cases. If the distribution of industry remains unchanged, i.e. the 
core stays in the north, the southern government is unconstrained by its desire to have the 
core, so it chooses t* equal to t*u as shown in the diagram.  
Figure 4: Second stage problem for southern government 
The south’s alternative is to set its rate low enough to ‘steal’ the core. Here the 
southern government’s objective function is the upper bell-shaped curve, and in this case, 
t* must be constrained to be no higher than t*
b – otherwise the core would stay in the 
north – and since the objective is increasing in t* at this point, if the south decides to steal 
the core, it would set its rate at t*
b. 
As noted, t*
b depends upon the tax rate set by the northern government in the first 
stage. Figure 4 shows two possibilities. When the north chooses a high tax rate, say t”, 
then t*
b is also high; for example, at the level marked as t*
b” in the diagram. When the 
north chooses a low tax, say t’, t*
b is also low, for example at t*
b’ in the diagram. As 
drawn, the southern government would lower t
* to t*
b” – and thus steal the core – if the 
northern government had chosen t” in the first period but not if it had chosen t’. In other 
words, if the north sets a very low tax rate in the first stage, the south will find it 
unattractive to set its tax rate low enough to take the core. 
Of course in stage one the northern government is aware of its influence over the 
south’s decision in stage two. In the first stage the north will presumably want to set its 
rate such that the south will not find it worthwhile to “snatch” the core. What the north 
has to do, then, is to push its tax rate low enough so that the south is indifferent between 
its unconstrained optimum without the core and its constrained optimum with it – a 
situation illustrated in Figure 5. The top panel of the diagram reproduces the stage-two 
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If the north wants to hold on to the core, it must set its equilibrium tax rate such 
that the south does not want to deviate from t*u. This in turn requires the “no deviation 
condition” to hold, that is: 
(18) 
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where te is the north’s equilibrium rate. Also, Y
p and Y
c are the south’s income when it is, 







Figure 5: First stage play 
We must also check that the north actually prefers the tax rate it needs to keep the 
core, but since we assume sL=½, this is easy. The north’s ‘with-core’ and ‘without-core’ 
objective functions are the same as those for the south, so we can use the top panel of 
Figure 5 to conduct the analysis. In particular, if the north allowed the south to capture 
the core, the north would find itself in the same situation as the south does in equilibrium. 
Consequently, the level of its objective function would be equal to We* in Figure 5. By 
contrast, when north plays te and keeps the core, the level of its objective function is 
higher than We* because te exceeds t*
b and t*
b is defined as the tax level where a nation 
with the core would be indifferent to not having it. What all this goes to say is that the 
north will always “limit tax” the south when it has the core.  
Plainly this “limit tax” game is akin to the equilibrium of a Stackleberg oligopoly 
game where the leader limit-prices a potential entrant. We turn now to studying the gap 
between the north’s and the south’s equilibrium tax rates. 
                                                 
9 Given (9) and our normalisation of E
w and K
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4.1.  Equilibrium tax gap 
The first point is that the equilibrium tax gap, i.e. te-t*u, is bell-shaped. Starting 
from a low level of openness, making trade freer first increases the gap, but then 
decreases it. The reason is plain. The south’s equilibrium tax rate t*u and its deviation tax 
rate, t*
b, do not depend upon trade freeness since W
* does not. But taking a log 
approximation of the no-delocation condition, the north’s rate te is approximately t*
b plus 
ln(Ω
c), and this means that the gap is bell-shaped since Ω
c is bell-shaped. The maximum 
gap occurs at the φ  where Ω
c is maximised, namely at φ
max as given in (15).  
Another easily established result is that when trade is almost perfectly free, the tax 
gap is negative, i.e. the core must have a lower tax rate in order to retain the core. In 
particular, since Ω
c=1 with φ =1, the no-delocation condition implies te= t*
b and the no-
deviation condition implies that t*
b<t*u. These two points tell us that the tax gap is bell-
shaped and the right-most point of the bell is negative.  
Comparing the absolute levels of the equilibrium tax rates over the full range of 
trade costs is more difficult since Ω
c involves non-integer powers and the distance 
between t*
b and t*u depends the functional form of W. To study this analytically, we 
adopt a specific functional form for the governments’ objective function. 
Figure 6: Trade openness and international tax competition 
4.1.1.  Specific functional forms 
Since the W function must be concave in the tax rate, we use the quadratic 
approximation for the north’s objective function: 
(19)   ) ( ; 2 /
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and W*=G*-(t*)
2/2. Using the steps described above, we get: 
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Using this and (13), we have: 
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While this north-south tax gap is bell-shaped as mentioned above, we cannot readily 
determine whether there are any levels of trade freeness for which the core has a higher 
tax rate, since Ω
c involves the non-integer power, 1-a. 
What we can do is to show that the core will have a higher tax rate when 
agglomeration forces are strong enough. To this end, note that the strength of 
agglomeration forces is limited by the no-black-hole condition a≤ 1, so by setting a=1 we 
consider the strongest allowable agglomeration forces. Moreover, the agglomeration rent 
is maximised at the level of openness given by (15). We thus plug a=1 and φ =φ
max into 
(15) to find that Ω
c equals 2/(1-b). Using this result and the fact that φ
max=0 when a=1 
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which is positive since b<1. Using the bell-shaped nature of the tax gap and the fact that 
it is positive at some level of φ
max, we know that the connection between trade openness 
and the equilibrium tax gap looks like the curve shown in Figure 6.  
Note that we would never find the north’s rate higher than the south’s if the 
unrestricted maximum of each region’s objective function were the same. The point is 
simple. Because the south sets its rate at the unconstrained maximum, the northern 
government would never want to have a higher rate. This is why we had to assume that 
the summit of the top bell-shaped curve in Figure 4 was to the right of the bottom bell-
shaped curve. 
4.2.  Modifications of BCTM results 
The fact that the core nation has a higher tax rate suggests a number of results that are 
counter to those of the basic tax competition model (BTCM). Specifically:  
Result 1 (trade costs matter): The equilibrium gap between the big and the 
small nations’ tax rates depends upon the integration of goods markets as well 
as the mobility of capital (Ludema and Wooton, 1998). 
Closer goods market integration raises the gap when markets are relatively closed, but 
reduces the gap when trade is relatively free.  
Result 2: When agglomeration forces are sufficiently strong and capital is 
internationally mobile, we should observe a positive correlation between 
capital-labour ratios and tax rates, i.e. the industrialised regions should have   19
higher tax rates other things equal. (The BTCM predicts a negative 
correlation.) 
Result 3: When size is defined in terms of supplies of the immobile factor (as 
in the BTCM), international tax competition in the presence of agglomeration 
forces and capital mobile may lead same-sized nations to have different 
equilibrium tax rates.  
In particular, when trade is sufficiently free, industry will agglomerate in one nation and 
that nation’s government may tax capital at a higher rate without losing capital due to the 
presence of agglomeration rents. By contrast, the BTCM predicts same-sized-nations will 
have equal tax rates. 
Stepping slightly outside the analysis above, we can suggest a further result. 
Starting with trade restricted enough to support the symmetric outcome (i.e. φ <φ
B, so 
sK=½), but increasing the degree of openness, we would see the emergence of the core-
periphery outcome with the mobile factor flowing from south to north. Although a full 
analysis of this possibility would require detailed dynamic reasoning, we conjecture that 
we would see the high tax nation being an importer of capital. This contradicts the BTCM 
prediction.  
4.2.1.  No capital mobility 
The main axis of investigation in the tax competition literature is the degree of 
capital mobility, so we consider the impact of perfect versus zero capital mobility on 
equilibrium tax rates. When there is no capital mobility, each region charges its 
unconstrained tax rate. Compared to the situation described above, this implies no change 
for the periphery region, but allows the core region to raise its tax rate (this can be seen 
clearly in Figure 5). In other words, the primary result of the BTCM – that tax 
competition leads to rates that are too low – is modified by the inclusion of 
agglomeration forces; tax competition and capital mobility lead only one of the two 
governments to be constrained in its choice of tax rates. In a ‘lumpy’ economy, only the 
core region needs to modify its taxes to keep the core. The south, which realises that the 
north will never let it win the core, sets its rate without regard to the northern tax rate. In 
other words, tax competition is a one-sided affair when agglomeration forces are 
important. 
4.2.2.  No agglomeration forces 
In this model we can, in the limit, eliminate agglomeration forces and imperfect 
competition by allowing σ  to get arbitrarily large. From (12) and the definitions of a and 
b, the break point level of trade free-ness limits to unity as σ  approaches infinity. What 
this means is that the core-periphery outcome would never arise with positive trade costs, 
so the nations’ incomes would be symmetric. Given (16), the equilibrium tax rates would 
be symmetric. Moreover, the spatial division of capital is a continuous variable at the 
symmetric outcome and since symmetry is stable without agglomeration forces, we 
would find that sK responded negatively to northern taxation. This, of course, would put 
us back in the BTCM world where symmetric countries compete over capital. While 
working this possibility out thoroughly is beyond the scope of this paper, the logic of the   20
BTCM suggest that the equilibrium tax rates would be below those that would be set 
without capital mobility.  
5. TAX HARMONISATION 
As it turns out, this setup suggests that tax harmonisation has somewhat 
unexpected results. In the basic tax competition model, tax harmonisation basically 
entails a shift from a non-cooperative tax game to a cooperative tax game; Pareto 
improvement from the government’s perspective follows by definition. In stark contrast, 
harmonisation makes one or both countries worse off when agglomeration forces are 
present. 
To see this, consider first the most straightforward tax harmonisation scheme, i.e. 
adoption of a common rate that lies between the two initial rates, i.e. te and tu
*. As it turns 
out, this split-the-difference harmonisation makes both the north and the south worse off 
as Figure 7 shows. First, note that this single rate, tA in the diagram, would not lead to a 
shift in the core from the north to the south since with equal taxes, firms prefer to stay 
agglomerated in the north. Given that the south remains without industry, its loss follows 
directly from the fact that its pre-harmonisation rate was an unconstrained maximum. 
Losses for the north are similarly clear. Compared to the initial equilibrium, the 
harmonisation forces the north to lower its tax rate, when in fact it would have preferred 
to raise it.  
Figure 7: Split-the-difference tax harmonisation 
A second possible candidate for the single-rate harmonisation would entail a rise 
in both nations’ rates to something like tc in the diagram. Here the north would gain 
(since its tax-competition constraint would be relaxed) but the south would lose for the 
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reasons just mentioned; any change in the equilibrium southern rate lowers the south’s 
welfare as measured by its government’s objective function. Lowering both rates to 
something like tB would make both governments worse off.  
In our model, in contrast to the basic tax competition model, it is easy to 
understand why there is no single rate that nations could agree upon. In a lumpy world, 
tax competition is a rather one-sided affair. The tax rate of the core nation is constrained 
by competition, while that of the periphery nation is not. Consequently, there is no 
mutual gain to cooperation. To summarise: 
Result 4: In contrast to the BTCM result, upward harmonisation of tax rates 
in the presence of capital mobility is not a Pareto improvement. In fact 
harmonising tax rates at any single level makes one or both nations worse off. 
While the most straightforward tax harmonisation scheme would never be agreed 
to, there is a simple proposal that would be weakly Pareto improving from the 
government’s perspectives, namely a simple tax floor set just below the equilibrium tax 
rate of the low-tax nation. The reasoning is straightforward. In order to dissuade the south 
from “stealing” the core in the limit tax game, the north must ensure that even if the south 
did get the core, it would be no better off than if it did not have the core. This, in turn, 
requires the north to base its rate on the off-equilibrium southern tax t*
b. And this despite 
the fact that the south ends up charging the higher rate t*u in equilibrium. By setting the 
minimum just below the south’s equilibrium rate, the minimum tax scheme rules out the 
off-equilibrium t*
b by fiat. Given this, the north can now base its rate on the higher 
equilibrium southern rate t*u. This effectively relaxes a binding constraint on north’s 
choice, so the tax-floor-scheme raises the level of the north’s objective function. The 
scheme has, by construction, no impact on the south’s situation. Thus: 
Result 5 (tax-floor harmonisation): A tax floor set just below the lowest 
equilibrium tax rate improves the situation for the north without harming the 
south. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper looks at the impact of tighter goods market integration on international 
tax harmonisation and tax competition when agglomeration economies are significant. 
The presence of agglomeration forces makes the economy “lumpy” in the sense that 
industry tends to stay together, either all in one region or all in the other. The lumpiness 
also gives industrialized nations – the so-called core nations – an advantage over the less 
industrialized nations – the so-called periphery. Agglomeration forces mean that industry 
is not indifferent to location in equilibrium; tax issues apart, each industrial firm 
understands that it earns more in the core than it would in the periphery. Knowing this, 
core governments can tax their industry at a higher rate than the periphery can, as long as 
the rate is not too much higher. Indeed, we can think of the core government as engaging 
in a “limit tax” game in which it sets a tax rate sufficiently low to make the periphery 
government abandon the idea of trying to attract the core. Moreover, given that the core 
government will not let industry go, the periphery government can choose its rate 
unconstrained by considerations of attracting industry. The result of this is that tax   22
competition is one sided. The core finds its tax rate constrained by potential competition 
from the periphery, but since the core limit taxes the south the south knows it will not get 
the core and so sets its tax rate on purely domestic concerns.  
In this sort of setup, it turns out that increased integration – defined by lower trade 
costs – has very non-monotonic effects on the equilibrium core-periphery tax gap. As is 
well known from the economic geography literature, agglomeration forces are strongest 
for intermediate trade cost, i.e., when trade costs are low enough to make agglomeration 
possible yet high enough to make it worthwhile. Due to this bell-shaped link between 
trade costs and agglomeration, integration naturally leads to a bell-shaped core-periphery 
tax gap in our limit-taxing game. Interestingly, average corporate tax rates in Europe do 
seem to have followed such a pattern. In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, European 
integration proceeded at a very rapid pace, yet the industrialized core nations (Germany, 
Benelux, France and Italy) keep their rates approximately steady while less industrialized 
periphery nations (Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece) lowered theirs. Integration has 
continued in the 1980s and during this integration phase, tax gaps narrowed, but much of 
the gap narrowing came from rising periphery tax rates. This was not a simple case of 
core nations having to cut their rates to match those of the periphery, as suggested by 
traditional analysis. 
The limit-taxing feature of a model with agglomeration forces also has important 
implications for tax harmonisation. The traditional analysis, based on Nash tax 
competition, views tax harmonisation as a shift from a non-cooperative outcome to a 
cooperative one; harmonisation is thus likely to improve the lot of all nations (or at least 
their governments). In our model, simple tax harmonisation – defined as adoption of a 
common tax rate – always harms at least one nation and the seemingly sensible policy of 
adopting a rate that is between the two initial rates turns out to harm both nations. 
Interestingly, a tax floor, even when it is set at the lowest equilibrium tax rate, leads to 
weak Pareto improvement, with the high-tax nation gaining and the low-tax nation being 
left indifferent.  
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